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Employment Protection Regulations and
New Hiring
Abstract
In the real world, there are various regulations concerned with the dismissal of
employees. We consider the effects of dismissal regulations with a simple incomplete
labor contract model. Under moral hazard, the existence of a regulation always increases
wage level and decreases firms' profits. However, the regulation can improve social
welfare if workers' outside option is sufficiently low. Furthermore, we will show that the
regulation can enhance new hiring.
JEL Classification Numbers: J41, K312
1. Introduction
In the U.S., there is the principle of employment at-will, under which firms and
workers can freely end the employment relationship at any time unless labor contracts
specify the duration of employment. On the other hand, in European countries and Japan,
since various employment protection regulations exist, firms cannot easily dismiss
employees unilaterally. According to OECD (1999), although deregulation of labor
markets since the 1980's chiefly affects short-term contracts and part timers, major change
in the regulations for regular workers has disappeared from European countries and Japan.
We consider the effect of employment protection regulations on wage, profit, social
welfare, employment level, and wage adjustment through renegotiation by a simple,
though crucial, labor contract model.
Numerous studies have focused on whether employment protection regulations
cause a high unemployment rate in European countries. Intuitively one may believe that
employment protection regulations discourage firms from employing workers since firms
cannot easily dismiss employees. However, according to our results, this is not the case;
the regulations may actually raise total employment. Bertola (1990) considered hiring and
firing costs to show that employment protection regulations can have a positive effect on
net employment level due to a firm's positive discount rate and the concavity of
production function. If the discount rate is zero, the firm can identify the firing cost as part
of the hiring cost. Hence, the existence of the firing cost leads to a high net hiring cost and
thus decreases total employment level. However, under the firm's positive discount rate
and the concavity of production function, the effect of decreasing unemployment due to the
firing cost is more than that of decreasing employment due to the hiring cost, if the firing
and hiring costs are almost equivalent. Marginal productivity of labor is lower in
recessions than in booms. Hence, under the situation of equivalent firing and hiring costs,
the positive effect of the firing cost on the employment level can exceed the negative
effect of the hiring cost and resulting in a higher net total employment level. Bentolila and
Bertola (1990) used a calibrated model with hiring and firing costs and analyzed the
effects of the regulations on employment level. They showed employment protection
regulations, denoted as a firing cost, discourage firms from dismissing employees more
than from hiring workers. On the other hand, Hopenhayn and  Rogerson (1993), using
calibration similar to Bentolila and  Bertola (1990), found that employment protection
regulations negatively impacted employment level. The regulations affect hiring and firing
in such a way as to induce effects on total employment opposite to that predicted by
Bentolila and Bertola.3
Saint-Paul (1995) introduces asymmetric job matching separation costs. If
workers quit a firm spontaneously, job matching separations are costless. However, if the
firm dismisses workers unilaterally, the firm must compensate the employee with some
amount of severance pay. When the firm faces a declining state, the firm can choose to
continue production or to stop production with a plant closing. If the severance pay is
high, the firm is unwilling to dismiss workers and may wait for workers to spontaneously
quit.  Saint-Paul (1995) demonstrated two  equilibria: high mobility and low
unemployment, and low mobility and high unemployment. The equilibrium of high
mobility and low unemployment, which dominates that of low mobility and high
unemployment from the view of ex ante social welfare, is likely to disappear with high
severance pay. Saint-Paul (1995) indicates that employment protection regulations can
increase the unemployment level due to the asymmetric costs of job matching separation.
As these studies imply, the effect of employment protection regulations on total
employment level is ambiguous since there are opposite predictions as to the net
employment effects of firing costs. Employment protection regulations decrease both job
creation and job destruction rates. There are also other reasons for this ambiguity. Bertola
and Rogerson (1997) focused on the influence of wage setting institutions to show that
relative wage compression is conducive to higher employer-initiated job matching
separation. In European countries, unions have played significant roles in central wage
bargaining so that wage differences across firms are likely to be small. Firms are willing
to adjust employee numbers under the inflexibility of wage adjustment. Naturally,
inflexibility of wage adjustment then leads to higher job turnover. On the other hand, there
are strict employment protection regulations in European countries, which provide a low
level of job matching separation. These opposite inputs affecting job turnover thus lead to
ambiguity in predicting employment level. The U.S., on the other hand, has a high relative
wage difference across firms and weak employment protection regulations. That is why
job creation and job destruction rates are remarkably similar between European countries
and the U.S. The difference in the effect of employment protection regulations on total
employment level disappears between Europe and the U.S.
Empirical studies have introduced different results of the effect of employment
protection regulations on total employment. Although  Lazear (1990) has found that
dismissal regulations restrict new hiring policies of firms in 22 developed countries,
Bertola (1990) indicates that the influence of the regulations on unemployment and the
employment level does not exist. Nickell (1997) finds a positive effect of the regulation
on employment of male workers from 25 to 54 years of age.
In this paper, using a simple but actual labor contract model, we will look at4
incentive problems as being another reason why employment protection regulations lead
to ambiguity when predicting total employment level. Furthermore, we analyze the effects
of employment protection regulations on a firm's profits, social welfare, and wage
adjustment through renegotiation.
Effects  of employment protection regulations differ sharply under symmetric
versus asymmetric information on workers' actions. With the symmetric information,
firms and workers take into account that regulations increase job security for employees,
and thus a lower wage covers the workers' effort cost when making an initial contract.
Hence, firms' profits under employment protection regulations can be higher than those
without the regulations.
However, with asymmetric information, or the moral hazard case, the above
statement must be modified. Typically, a worker's incentive would be the possibility of
being dismissed in a recession. So with perfect job security for any state, workers would
be unwilling to make efforts given a constant basic wage. Hence, high job security caused
by employment protection regulations discourages workers' efforts. Under moral hazard
with the regulations, firms must increase the basic wage in order to motivate and provide
workers' incentives. Therefore, firms lose the free controllability of determining
employment level and offer a higher wage level, which decreases firms' profits.
Employment protection regulations do not always decrease social welfare and
new hiring by firms. The regulations have an effect of increasing job security which can
improve social welfare. We will show that employment protection regulations improve
social welfare when the outside option for workers is sufficiently low. Furthermore, new
hiring under employment protection regulations can exceed that without the regulations.
Under moral hazard, the threat of dismissal encourages workers to make efforts, and the
more workers firms employ, the higher will be the possibility of dismissals in a recession.
A large amount of new hiring stimulates the workers' survival race and motivates workers
so that firms can decrease the wage level by hiring many workers, which can increase
firms' profits.
In a recession, wage adjustment through renegotiation can increase the ex post
welfare of firms and employees under contractual incompleteness. Without employment
protection regulations, a lower wage and dismissal are always implemented in the
renegotiation stage. However, increase of wage and dismissal can be realized as the
result of wage adjustment under the renegotiation because the regulations lead to excess
of job security from the viewpoint of ex post welfare.
This paper is organized as follows: in chapter 2, the difference in employment
protection regulations between Europe, the U.S., and Japan is surveyed; the labor contract5
model is provided in chapter 3; chapter 4 focuses on the effect of the regulations on total
employment level; renegotiation for wage adjustment is analyzed in chapter 5; and
conclusions in chapter 6.
2. Employment Protection Regulations
Emerson  (1988) points out the importance of obstacles to the termination of
employment contracts in European countries, in particular, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Norway, and Sweden. For
example, in Germany, the dismissal restriction law strictly sets forth the conditions under
which employees are dismissed. Abraham and  Houseman (1993, p.18) describe the
dismissal regulation in Germany as follows: "All dismissals in Germany must be socially
justified. When a dismissal is legal, certain procedures must be followed. In an
individual dismissal, the employer must give the worker advance notice of the dismissal.
In a collective dismissal, the local labor force and the work council have some power to
affect the timing and the terms of the layoff." In European countries there are various
dismissal regulations similar to those in Germany. 'Just cause' on dismissal is required
and firms cannot dismiss employees unilaterally.
Although, in Japan, free dismissal of employees with at least thirty days' notice
or with one month's wage payment is allowed in labor law, there is actually a strict
restriction on dismissal of employees. The doctrine of abusive dismissal ( Kaiko-ken
Ranyo Hori) has been formulated by the accumulation of judicial precedents since the
1950s (Sugeno (1997) and  Yamakawa (1996)). The doctrine, which is based on the
doctrine of an abuse of rights, established as a general doctrine in civil law, does not
allow dismissal without objectively reasonable and just cause. Also, even if a firm has
reasonable cause, an inappropriate dismissal, inconsistent with the social common sense,
is prohibited under this doctrine. When some employees do damage to a firm, the firm
cannot easily dismiss them as a punitive punishment under this doctrine. In Japan,
(implicit) long-term employment contracts have frequently been made, and hence
dismissed workers often have difficulty in a job search. Courts have often concluded that
punitive dismissals are too severe for workers, while still judging that the behavior of the
workers is immoral and improper.
There are also restrictive constraints for dismissals in plant closings or mass
layoffs. Under these constraints, firms must curtail dismissals as much as possible in
recessions. If firms attempt to dismiss workers, the following is required: (1) firms must6
first use all possible means to avoid the dismissals such as shifting workers to other
workshops and decreasing working hours; (2) firms must not participate in irrational
behaviors such as increasing new hiring; (3) firms must choose the dismissed among
employees reasonably and fairly; and (4) firms must follow the appropriate procedures
specified in labor law and through industrial promises. The doctrine is, therefore, quite
restrictive for dismissals.
In the U.S., the common law doctrine of employment at-will is dominant in many
states. Union members are often protected from unilateral dismissals since the labor
agreements between firms and unions usually stipulate on important employment
conditions such as dismissals, transfers, and grievance and arbitration procedures.
However, most workers are not under the protection of labor agreements in unionized
firms because the union membership rate in the U.S. is about only 10 %. As Krueger
(1991) and Grenig (1991) indicate, the modification of employment at-will in the U.S. is
a recent occurrence. In most states the exceptions to employment at-will have been
allowed in court. There are three exceptions: public policy exception, implied contract
exception, and good faith exception. State legislation which specifies 'just cause' as a
requirement for dismissal has been proposed in ten states since the 1980s. Although only
Montana passed a broad law to protect at-will employees from unjust dismissal, Krueger
(1991) suggests the trend of employment protection is strengthened. Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) which was passed as a federal law in 1988
obliges firms employing over 100 full-time workers to give notice to employees at least
sixty days before a plant closing and mass layoff. In 1991, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Law proposed the Model Employment Termination Act
which requires 'just cause' for dismissals.
3. The Basic Model
We consider a very simple employment contract which specifies only a basic
wage level. Matters on job security do not exist at all. Labor contracts are incomplete due
to huge transaction costs, and thus firms and workers cannot make contracts contingent on
the state. Actually, as is often observed, in the real world, (long-term) labor contracts
describe only wage level and do not explicitly specify how long to continue the
employment relationship. In Japan, as Sugeno (1997) and Yamakawa (1996) state, the
labor standard law prohibits firms from making explicit long-term contracts beyond one
year as a protection for workers based on the idea that workers are weaker than firms in7
an industrial relationship.
1 Hence, labor law does not allow explicit long-term contracts
by which workers are bound to a particular firm.
2 In the U.S., if firms and workers intend
to keep the industrial relationship beyond one year, formal employment contracts are
required in order to prevent fraud. Though in reality, few of these contracts are really
formal. This basic model is thus relevant to actual labor contracts.
Timing of decision by workers and the firm is as follows:
蝀 The firm has a labor pool N and offers a verifiable wage level w to workers.
蝁 Risk neutral workers determine whether to accept or reject the offer and whether to
make efforts or not. If rejected, there is no more contract negotiation.
蝂 When workers accept the wage offer, then Nature chooses a state: a boom or a
recession. The state is observable.
蝃 The firm chooses an optimal real employment level. Dismissed workers receive the
outside option  w . On the other hand, the retained employees in the firm receive the
wage level specified in the labor contract.
The effort level is discrete and the cost of providing efforts is c. The firm cannot
observe whether workers have provided efforts or not. Providing efforts is not only
necessary for learning skills essential to the firm but also for influencing the states of the
firm. Efforts provided by  all employees enhance the occurrence of a good state. Two
states, a boom and a recession, exist:  q q > > 0. A boom allows the realization of full
employment, but the firm cannot use labor inputs greater than its own labor pool N since
outside workers have not learned the essential skills. On the other hand, a recession is so
severe that the firm unwilling or unable to maintain full employment. If all workers
provide efforts, the probability of a boom is  p . Otherwise, the probability of a boom is
p:  p p > . At this time, it makes sense to consider the labor pool N exogenously given,
and normalize it to 1. Decision on the labor pool will be taken up later.
The firm's profit is given by
p q q q q q ( ) ( ) , = - ˛ f L wL m r,
where  L N ( ) £ = 1  is the real employment level and the production function f is strictly
concave.
                                                
1 The amendment of the labor standard law in 1998 allows that workers with special knowledge
which is essential to the job, such as development of new technology or the setting up or shutting
down of a business, and elder workers over age sixty may make contracts for three years at most.
2 Basic wage should be specified on labor contracts. If no specific wage were described, firms might
pay an insufficient wage since the firms could not be punished in court.8
For the convenience of later discussion, consider the first best contract. Social
welfare W:
W p f L p f L p L w c ” + - + - - - q q q q q ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( )( ( )) 1 1 1 .
Clearly, the maximum of social welfare is induced by the employment level:
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Here, as a benchmark analysis, consider that no incentive problem exists. First,
consider the case without employment protection regulations. From the assumption on the
firm's state and employment level,
L and L L f
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1 .                         ...(1)
Individual rationality with no incentive problem is given by
U pw p wL w L c w = + - + - - ‡ ( ) * ( *) 1 1 l q .                        ...(2)
Next, consider the case with employment protection regulations. The regulations
force the firm to maintain the employment level as high as possible, that is, the regulations
induce a high employment level  LR wherein the firm's profit is zero,
p q q R R R R f L w L ( ) ( ) = - = 0, where  L or w R R  is employment or wage level,
respectively. Since we assume that full employment is realized in a boom but is not
maintained in a recession, it holds that
L and L L R R ( ) ( )
* q q = = < 1 1,                                  ...(3)
where LR
* satisfies  qf L w L R R R ( )
* * - = 0. Under the regulations, individual rationality is
U pw p wL w L c w R R R R = + - + - - ‡ ( ) ( )
* * 1 1 m r .                      ...(4)
Since the firm's profit is a decreasing function of wage level, individual
rationality, both with the regulation (2) and without (4) are binding. We can show
w wR >  under the no incentive problem case. Suppose that  w and wR are equal. Under
w=wR, the dismissal regulation leads to high job security:  L LR
* * <  (figure 1). Hence, the
following inequality holds:
U w U w R ( ) ( ) <    for any positive w.                              ...(5)
See figure 2.  L and LR
* *  are decreasing functions of wage level. Note that the curves of
UR and  U are not always expressed like this. However, if  w is sufficiently low, the
expected utility of workers who have made efforts is negative even if high employment
stability is realized. On the other hand, a very high wage lowers job security, so that
workers' expected utility is negative. Inequality (5) indicates that the curve UR is upper to
the curve  U for any positive wage. The firm chooses the lowest wage level among9
multiple solutions of (2) and (4) since a low wage increases the firm's profit. As figure 2
suggests, it is obtained that  w wR > . Since  L LR
* * <  holds under  w wR = , it is clearly
obtained that  L LR
* * <  under  w wR > .
Next, compare social welfare with and without the dismissal regulation:
W p f p f L p L w c
or
W p f p f L p L w c R R R
= + - + - - -
= + - + - - -
q q
q q
( ) ( ) ( *) ( )( *)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
* *
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
Clearly, using  L LR
* * < , social welfare under the dismissal regulation can exceed that
without the regulation:
W W p f L f L w L L R R R - = - - - - ( ) ( ) ( *) ( *)
* * 1 qc h n s                    ...(6)
The dismissal regulation improves social welfare if the outside option  w  is sufficiently
low. Since  w w >  holds, without the regulation employment level in a recession is less











- - 1 1 . Since the regulation
increases employment level in a recession, the regulation has an effect of improving
social welfare. On the other hand, the regulation may lead to an excess employment level
in the recession to the first best level, which is a negative effect on social welfare. When
w  is sufficiently low, the former positive effect will exceed the latter negative one.
Since (2) and (4) are binding,
P P R R W w W w = - = - , .
Hence,  P P R >  holds if  W W R > , and vice versa. The regulation increases the firm's
profit if social welfare is improved by the regulation. Although the firm loses ex post free
controllability of employment level under the regulation, the firm can lower the wage
level. Thus, the ex ante expected profit of the firm can increase.
Moral hazard case
Here we have the case in which the firm cannot observe employees' efforts level.
First, consider the case without the dismissal regulation. Incentive compatibility under
moral hazard is given by
U pw p wL w L c pw p wL w L = + - + - - ‡ + - + - ( )( ( )) ( )( ( ))
* * * * 1 1 1 1 .  ...(7)
The right hand of incentive compatibility (7) is the workers' expected utility when
workers shirk. Hence, (7) is replaced as follows:
I w w w L
c
( ) ( )( *) ” - - ‡ 1
D
                                     ...(7)'
where  D ” - p p.
Next, consider the dismissal regulation case. Under the dismissal regulation,10
incentive compatibility under moral hazard is similarly given by
I w w w L
c
R R R R ( ) ( )( )
* ” - - ‡ 1
D
.                                  ...(8)
Since the firm's profit is a decreasing function of wage level, (7)' and (8) are
binding. We will show  w wR <  under moral hazard.
Suppose that w and wR are identical. Under w=wR, in the same manner as the no
incentive problem case, the dismissal regulation leads to high job security:  L LR
* * < .
Hence, the following inequality holds under w=wR:
I w w w L w w L I w R R ( ) ( )( *) ( )( ) ( )
* = - - > - - = 1 1 .                   ...(9)
See figure 3.  L and LR
* *   are decreasing functions with respect to wage, and thereby
I w and I w R ( ) ( ) are increasing functions of w. Since (7)' and (8) are always binding, it is
obtained that  w wR < .                                                ...(10)
By providing a high effort level, workers can increase the probability of a boom,
and thus they are likely to stay employed at the firm and receive a wage higher than their
outside option. Hence, workers are willing to make efforts even when there is no explicit
punishment for shirking.
3 Thus, the dismissal regulation weakens workers' motivation.
The firm must pay a higher wage to encourage workers to make efforts since the
regulation gives employees high job security.
Since (7)' and (8) are binding,  L LR
* * <  is obtained from (10). Hence, the effect
of the dismissal regulation on social welfare is similar to the no incentive problem case;
the regulation can improve social welfare when  w  is sufficiently low. However, we
will show that profit of the firm under the regulation is less than for the firm without the
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The last inequality is obtained from the viewpoint that L is the optimal employment level
of the firm given w. Therefore, the dismissal regulation always decreases profit of the
firm:  P P R < . High job security and a high payment decrease the profits of firms.
                                                
3 This result is similar to the efficiency wage model (for example, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) or
Bulow and Summers (1986)) at the point that a payment higher than the outside option encourages
employees to provide efforts. However, in the efficiency wage model, monitoring of employees
plays a significant role in having the incentive scheme work since monitoring is essential when
dismissal is the punishment for shirking. In our model, it is not necessary to monitor employees in
the firm. The firm's right of control in the dismissal of employees works as the incentive scheme.11
In summary, the dismissal regulation weakens workers' motivation and
decreases the firm's profit under moral hazard even if the regulation improves social
welfare. This result is contrary to the no incentive problem case, where the dismissal
regulation can increase the firm's profit.
4. New Hiring
Next, we consider the influence of the dismissal regulation on new hiring by
analyzing the optimal labor pool size N. First, we consider the case without the regulation.
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previously, (7)" is binding since a lower wage raises profit. On the equilibrium, as figure
3 implies, the following condition holds given N:
d w w L L
dw
( ) ( ) * - -
‡
q m r
0.                                    ...(12)
Unless (12) is satisfied, the firm can raise its profit by wage decline given N while the
incentive compatibility of workers holds. Hence, from assumption (11), the decrease of
the initial labor pool makes wage decline possible so that the firm can improve profit.
Therefore,  N f
w
£ FH IK
- ( ' )
1
q
 holds on the equilibrium. Thus, it is obtained that
L N f
w
( ) ( ' ) q
q
= £ FH IK
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In this case,  L N ( ) q = . Differentiate (7)",
1 0 2 - -
























< 0 and L*<N, it holds that12
dw
dN
< 0.                                                    ...(14)
Furthermore, using the envelope theorem, the first order condition on the initial labor
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Hence, the initial employment level given by (13) is not optimal. Therefore, on the
equilibrium, the firm determines the optimal initial labor pool as follows:
N N f
w
= ” FH IK
- * ( ' )
1
q
.                                         ...(15)
An increase of the labor pool  N given the wage level raises the dismissal rate for
employees, and thus decreases workers' expected wage in a recession. On the other hand,
it does not influence the expected wage in a boom if full employment is realized. Thus, as
(14) indicates, since the increase of N motivates workers, the firm can decline the wage
level and raise profit.
Next, we consider the effect on new hiring when there is a dismissal regulation
case. The dismissal regulation always leads to zero profit if the firm dismisses some
workers. Hence, the firm is willing to maintain full employment and obtain a positive
profit in a boom. Incentive compatibility is
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* * m r 0 ,
it holds on the optimal initial labor pool NR* under the dismissal regulation that
qf N w R R ' ( )
* - < 0.                                            ...(17)
Inequality (17) implies that the firm under the regulation is willing to hire excess workers
when considering the firm's ex post profit maximization in a boom. This is contrary to the
no regulation case, where the optimal employment level in a boom is realized as shown in
(15).
Suppose that the initial hiring level without the dismissal regulation is equivalent
to the optimal initial hiring level with the dismissal regulation:  N N R =
*. Although we
obtain from (10),13
  q q f N w f N w R R R ' ( ) ' ( )
* * - < - ,
the right hand of this inequality may be positive or negative, that is, the optimal hiring
level under the regulation may or may not exceed that without the regulation.
If  qf N w R R ' ( )
* - = 0 holds instead of (17), then
0 = - < - q q f N w f N w R R R ' ( ) ' ( )
* *
leads to  N N R
* * < . Since the dismissal regulation discourages employees from making
efforts, firms have to offer a higher wage to motivate them. The regulation increases wage
as an employment cost, and thus provides the decline in the hiring level as the above
inequality shows. On the other hand, as we have stated, an increased employment pool
provides a higher dismissal risk for employees. Hence, by increasing the hiring level,
employees are encouraged to make efforts and firms can decrease wage. The regulation
induces opposing effects on the hiring level. Thus, the effect of employment protection
regulations on new hiring is ambiguous. Although the firm seems to restrict the number of
new hires due to the dismissal regulation, the new hiring under the dismissal regulation
can exceed new hiring without the regulation.
We give an example to show that new hiring under the dismissal regulation can
be higher than without the regulation.
An example







2 , , , , , ( ) . q q , it is
obtained that  w w N and N R R = = = = 1 1 518 0 987 1 .404, . , . , .
It would be short-sighted to conclude that the dismissal regulation, like employment
protection laws, discourages firms from employing new workers.
5. Wage Adjustment through Renegotiation
Since the firm and the workers cannot make contracts contingent on the state,
renegotiation may improve welfare after a state is observed. When a renegotiation offer is
not accepted, the wage specified in the original contract is paid and the real employment
level  L or LR *
*  is chosen as we have shown in the previous section. The new wage
offer in the renegotiation stage is denoted as  ~ w . If the renegotiated offer is accepted, it
would be "the renegotiation offer":
( ) * ( ~ )
~
w w L w w L - £ - ,                                        ...(18)14
where  ~
L  is the new employment level in the renegotiation stage given  ~ w . Inequality
(18) indicates that the newly offered expected wage is more than, or at least equivalent to,
the original expected wage.
Note that renegotiation occurs only in a recession. In a boom, renegotiation does
not occur since full employment is realized leaving no room for renegotiation to improve
social welfare. Because the firm cannot decrease wage in order to increase employment,
the firm has no incentive for renegotiation. However, if the firm's state is severe,
renegotiation might increase the firm's profit.
First, we consider the case with no regulation. In this case, renegotiation always
decreases wage level and increases employment level in a recession. If an increased
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f L wL f L wL w w
f L wL
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This last inequality is introduced from the viewpoint that L* is the optimal employment
level of the firm given w. Hence, the firm is unwilling to offer an increased wage in the
renegotiation stage. Furthermore, (18) is always binding since the firm can raise its profit
by providing the lower wage offer in the renegotiation stage.
Next, we consider the case with the regulation in effect. Incentive compatibility
for the renegotiation offer is similarly given by
( ) (~ )
~ * w w L w w L R R R R - £ - .                                     ...(18)'
If full employment is enforceable by renegotiation, (18)' is always binding since the firm
is willing to offer the new low wage:
~ ( )
* w w w L w R R R = - + .
Renegotiation leads to a lower wage and a higher employment level than in the original
employment contract. However, if full employment is not enforceable in the renegotiation
stage, effects of renegotiation will be more complex.
The employment protection regulation leads to zero profit in a recession. After
all, if full employment is not enforceable in the renegotiation stage, the firm makes no
profit. Hence, the firm is indifferent to any renegotiation offer. We assume that the ex post
utility of the worker is maximized under zero profit of the firm in the renegotiation stage.
Thus, (18)' is not binding, that is, the ex post utility during a recession is more than that
observed in the initial contracts.
On making the initial contracts, workers and the firm anticipate the result of
renegotiation, which means the basic wage level is affected by the possibility of
renegotiation. Because renegotiation can improve the utility of workers in a recession, the
possibility of renegotiation discourages workers' motivation. Hence, the firm has to offer15
a higher wage when making the initial contract in order to induce workers to make efforts,
which means the anticipation of renegotiation decreases the firm's profit. On the other
hand, in the no regulation case, the existence of renegotiation has  no influence on
determining the initial wage level since incentive compatibility for renegotiation (18) is
always binding.
Furthermore, renegotiation under the regulation may lead to a paradoxical case,
where renegotiation yields a high wage and low employment level. In figure 4,  A is
implemented by the original contracts, but renegotiation leads to B. This paradox does not
occur without the regulation. The paradoxical case occurs because the regulation can lead
to a higher employment level than the first best level. If  L f
w







adjustment through renegotiation raises wage level and decreases employment level.
Under the no renegotiation scenario, since it always holds that
L f
w





-1 , renegotiation leads to a higher employment level and lower
wage than in the original contract.
In the real world, renegotiation is not seen as decreasing employment. The
regulation under which firms must keep their employment levels as high as possible in a
recession may actually limit workers' chances of improving their ex post utility.
6. Conclusion and Discussion
We have considered effects of the dismissal regulation with an actual incomplete
labor contract model. Our model is very simple compared to the calibrated models. The
dismissal regulation discourages employees from making efforts which is not beneficial
for firms. Under moral hazard, the existence of regulations like employment protection
laws always increases wage level and decreases firms' profits. Furthermore, the
regulations can raise the total employment level because an increased number of
employees decreases the survival rate for an individual employee, and thus motivates
employees. To the contrary, under the no incentive problem, the regulation always
decreases wage level and can increase firms' profits. Furthermore, social welfare can be
improved by the dismissal regulations regardless of incentive problems. Employment
protection regulations can have both negative and positive effects.
Unions have a large stake in the dismissal regulation. Under this regulation,
firms usually must negotiate with unions prior to dismissing employees. It has frequently16
been stated that the dismissal regulation strengthens the power of unions. Certainly, if the
firm cannot dismiss employees freely, the bargaining power of unions may be
strengthened. According to the insider-outsider theory (Lindbeck and Snower (1988)),
unions might be more willing to increase wage under the regulation than without the
regulation. As Blanchard and Summers (1987) show as hysteresis, the continuous actions
of unions for an increase of wage yield low employment and a high unemployment level
for an extended time. Thus, numerous discussions and analyses on deregulation of labor
markets have appeared since the late 1980s. Indeed, in Europe, as OECD (1994) points
out, the collective bargaining coverage rates are very high at about 80%. For example, the
coverage rates of Germany and France are 90% and 92%, respectively, whereas the
collective bargaining coverage rate in the U.S. is small at 18%.
However, it seems that the dismissal regulation does not always make unions
more aggressive. In Japan, where there are strict regulations on dismissals, the collective
bargaining coverage rate is a small 23%. Empirical studies have found that the wage
effect of unions is insignificant or negative in Japan (Tachibanaki and Noda (1993), Tsuru
and  Rebitzer (1995), and  Brunello (1992)). Therefore, although our model does not
involve the effect of the dismissal regulation on collective bargaining, which is similar to
the models of  Bertola (1990),  Bentolila and  Bertola (1990), and  Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993), our analysis focusing on the effects of the regulation is appropriate and
effective.17
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